This paper studies a marriage market with two-sided information asymmetry in which the gains from marriage are stochastic. Contracts specify divisions of ex-post realized marital surplus. I first study a game in which one side of the matching market offers contracts. I show that when expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, no separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency exists. I then study a social planner's problem, finding necessary and sufficient conditions for a truthful direct revelation mechanism to achieve matching efficiency. These conditions become more stringent as the number of agents in the matching market increases.
surplus. However, in the literature on matching markets with information asymmetry, how to split the shares are often pre-imposed, so there is no room for negotiation. For instance, both Damiano and Li [8] and Hoppe et.al. [9] examined the setting in which a man x matches with a woman y, together they produce 2xy with certainty and each partner gets half of the produced output. The half-half sharing rule is fixed and known ex-ante to all types of agents. It seems inconsistent that, whereas in models of frictionless marriage markets, the sharing rule and the matching outcome are simultaneously determined, in models of markets with information asymmetry, the sharing rule is exogenously imposed.
The second novelty of this paper's analysis is that the gains from marriage are stochastic. The stochastic component of marital surplus is often ignored in the literature on matching markets with information asymmetry. An individual's uncertainty about match surplus comes only from uncertainty about the type of his or her partner. Such an assumption ignores the possibility of shocks to the marital surplus after matching, yet the shocks can have important consequences. In fact, in most of the literature on divorce and re-marriages, shocks to marital output play an important role in generating equilibria. Browning, Chiappori and Weiss [10] show that high aggregate divorce rates can be beneficial because they facilitate the recovery from negative shocks to match quality, allowing couples to replace bad marriages by better ones. This paper assumes divorce is hugely costly; therefore before any match, people use the available information as much as possible in order to achieve a good matching outcome and avoid future separation. I
show that the stochastic component of the marital surplus is important in determining whether or not a mechanism achieving efficient matching exists.
A related paper which also relates noise to efficiency is by Bahkar and Hopkin [11] as they examine pre-marital investment with stochastic returns. The main difference is that their main focus is on efficiency of pre-marital investment rather than efficient matching, and their setting is a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility.
Another related work in progress by Dizdar and Moldovanu [12] (written independently) asks questions in the same spirit: What sharing rules are compatible with a truthful direct revelation mechanism that achieves matching efficiency? This paper differs mainly in two aspects. First, unlike their paper, where agents are allowed to compete with ex-ante monetary transfers before the match process, I exclude any ex-ante monetary transfer and investigate whether matching efficiency can be achieved by endogenous sharing rules alone. Second, while their analysis rules out stochastic shocks to matching output and examines an ex-post equilibrium, I allow marital gains to be stochastic and characterize the conditions under which a Bayesian Nash equilibrium may be found.
To examine how the sharing rules and the matching outcomes are endogenously deter-mined in a model with two-sided information asymmetry, I adopt the standard assumption in the marriage literature 1 regarding how couples bargain over the surplus: Prospective couples can make binding, costlessly enforceable, prenuptial agreements to transfer resources within marriage. This assumption has been labeled Binding Agreements on the Marriage Market (BAMM) 2 .
Since contracts proposing how to divide the match surplus are credible, binding and costlessly enforceable, this paper asks: Do there exist contracts that help achieve an efficient matching outcome? To answer this question first note that individuals in this setting face two types of uncertainty. The first type arises from asymmetry of information;
ex-ante a woman (or a man) cannot observe her (his) potential partners' types, so she (he)
does not know whom to match with and therefore is not sure about the amount of marital output produced after a match. If we let agents on one side of the matching market offer contracts, the sharing rules proposed need to serve two purposes: revealing one's type (signaling) and attracting a suitable partner (screening). There may exist trade-offs between these two functions. The second type of uncertainty arises because the marital output contains random elements; even without information asymmetry, after a match has formed, the total marital output produced is subject to a random shock. Therefore contracts can only specify how to divide each ex-post realized surplus. This worsens the trade-offs between signaling and screening of a contract. I show that because of the stochastic nature, prenuptial contracts proposing divisions of ex-post realized marital surplus may be ineffective in achieving matching efficiency.
Outline
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 studies a game in which one side of the matching market offers contracts proposing sharing rules, each agent on the other side chooses a contract to accept. I show that when expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, matching efficiency cannot be achieved.
Section 3 proceeds to a social planner's problem where a social planner aims to maximize the aggregate matching surplus. He commits to a matching rule and designs contracts specifying sharing rules conditional on the reported types and the realization of the surplus of each matched pairs. A social planner can do strictly better in terms of achieving 1 See Gale and Shapley [13] ; Becker [1] ; Choo and Siow [14] ; Iyigun and Walsh [15] ; Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss [16] ; Browning, Chiappori and Weiss [10] . 2 This assumption is not as strong as it sounds. Any transfer that (i) is decided before marriage, and
(ii) can be used to alter the spouse's respective bargaining positions after marriage is considered as a BAMM framework (Browning, Chiappori and Weiss [10] ).
matching efficiency than the equilibrium of the game in which one side offers contracts. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the truthful direct revelation mechanism to achieve matching efficiency. I show that these conditions become more stringent as the number of agents in the matching market increases. When the number of agents becomes very large, matching efficiency is not achievable even in the social planner's setting.
Comparisons of alternative models and some extensions are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Assumptions in this paper
Main assumptions in this paper are the following:
• Transferable Utility.
• Binding Agreements Costlessly enforceable (BAMM).
• Asymmetric Information on both sides of the market.
• Gains from Marriage are Stochastic.
Game with One Side Offering Contracts
There are N women and N men, all are risk neutral. Each one is independently drawn from a distribution with probability 1 2 to be a high type agent and probability 1 2 to be a low type agent. Each agent observes only his or her own type. The payoff of an unmatched agent is assumed to be 0 regardless of types.
Benchmark Model: Matching Surplus is Deterministic
For each possible combination of types, we have the following:
The first equation denotes that when a high type woman, denoted by W H , matches with a high type man, denoted by M H , together they will produce a matching surplus of magnitude z 2 . Similarly for other three combination of types. The match surplus z 2 , z 1 , z 1 and z 0 are different values 3 , and satisfy the supermodularity condition: Table 1 calculates the expected matching outcomes of offering the two equilibrium contracts respectively. Given a woman knows her own type, she needs to first work out the possible scenarios she will face before offering a contract. The first line in Table 1 summarizes the following: The probability that of the other three agents, one turns out to be a low type woman, one a high type man and one a low type man is 1 4 , given that each agent is independently drawn from a population with probability 1 2 to be a high type agent and probability 1 2 to be a low type agent. Since the other woman is of low type, and W L offers contract B in the equilibrium, if the woman offers contract A, she will be regarded as a high type woman and hence attract only M H . If she offers contract B, then men believe there are two low type women and are indifferent between them. She has half probability to be matched with M H and half probability to be matched with M L .
The reasoning is the same for other scenarios. Comparing the two expected matching outcomes, we see that offering contract A has a higher probability of matching with M H and offering contract B has a higher probability of matching with M L .
Remark 1
Only when there is exactly one M H and one M L , offering different contracts may make a difference to the matching outcome. If the two men turn out to be of the same type, all contracts offering men non-negative payoffs achieve the same matching outcome and there is no efficiency loss in matching due to information asymmetry.
Therefore in subsequent analysis, I mainly focus on scenarios with exactly one M H and one M L . To prove such a separating equilibrium exists, we need to show that given the other woman is offering the right equilibrium contract, the woman will not deviate from offering her equilibrium contract. To examine whether a deviation-either by offering an off-equilibrium contract or a "wrong" equilibrium contract (W H offers contract B, or W L offers contract A)-is profitable, I categorize all the contracts in terms of matching outcomes achieved when com-peting against contract A and against contract B (see Table 2 ). "Attract both" means both types of men go for that contract first, only when not successfully matched, a man will go for the remaining equilibrium contract. "Attract only M H " means only M H prefers the contract to the other contract (one of the equilibrium contracts), while M L prefers an equilibrium contract. Similar definitions for "Attract only M L " and "Attract both". There does not exist a deviating off-equilibrium contract that achieves "attract neither" or "attract only M H " when competing against contract B or contract A. Since both contracts offer 0 to M L , for any deviating contract offering M L a non-negative payoff, he prefers the deviating contract to an equilibrium contract. This explains the "Not Exist"
in row 1, row 3, column 1 and column 3 in Table 2 .
Only the equilibrium contract A achieves "attract only M H " when competing against contract B. When the other woman also offers contract A, there is half probability the woman gets M H and half probability she gets M L . I put contract A into the category "attract both" when competing against contract A. Similarly I put contract B into the category "attract only M L " when competing against contract A and "attract both" when competing against contract B.
As contract B offers 0 to M H , to achieve "attract only M L " against contract B, a deviating contract must also offer M H 0 expected payoff. Contract C and contract E 1 below achieve "attract only M L " when competing against contract B, and contract A 5 :
Contract C Surplus Woman Man
Contract E 3 achieves "attract both" when competing against contract A, and against contract B 7 .
Contract E 3 Table 2 , given the other woman is offering the "right" equilibrium contract, 
Surplus Woman Man
to M H , anything less than this amount will lead a low type woman to deviate to offer up to
− ε in order to attract M H over and achieve a better matching outcome, and subsequently a higher expected payoff.
Second, for a high type woman, deterring a low type man is costless; she offers 0 to M L conditional on z 1 and M H 's payoff of matching with contract A is not affected.
Remark 3
In the benchmark model, even we do not observe agents' types before a match, after observing the surplus, we can deduce the type of each agent with certainty. This enables different types of women to signal their types costlessly. When there is no competition between women of different types, women (the side offering contracts) extract all the surplus. When there is competition, men of the type desired by both women will get a positive amount while the not-preferred type gets 0 surplus 8 . A separating equilibrium with an efficient matching outcome can always be found in the contracts-offering game.
The Model: Matching Surplus is Stochastic
Where Y G > Y B ≥ 0, denote the good and the bad realization of surplus respectively.
, where i = 0, 1, 1 , 2, denotes probability of realizing the good surplus state.
The first line represents that when a high type woman matches with a high type man, they will realize the good surplus state with probability p 2 and the bad surplus state with probability 1 − p 2 . Their expected match surplus is z 2 . Similarly for the rest combination of types. As before, the expected match surplus z satisfies the supermodularity condition: Surplus Woman Man 
Equilibrium beliefs:
between payoffs of contract A and contract B, he goes for contract A.
Off-equilibrium beliefs: µ(W H |any off-equilibrium contracts)=
Off-equilibrium response rule: When being indifferent between an equilibrium contract and an off-equilibrium contract, both M H and M L will always go to an off-equilibrium contract first. ε = p 1 ε, and is also p 1 ε when being matched with contract B. He is indifferent between the payoffs and will go for contract A.
A low type man's expected payoff of matching with contract A is p 1
ε, which is smaller than p 0 ε, the expected payoff of being matched with contract B, since z 1 < z 0 and 
M H prefers contract A to contract B if and only if
M L prefers contract B to contract A if and only if
For contract A to be different from contract B, we need β 1 = α 1 or β 0 = α 0 , or both.
As z 1 > z 0 and z 2 > z 1 ,
expected matching surplus produced. To prevent a profitable deviation to the largest extent, I specify men's indifference behavior as the following: When being indifferent between expected payoffs of contracts, M H will always first go for an equilibrium contract (contract A or contract B), and M L will always first go for an off-equilibrium contract.
Step 1 
Given specified men's indifference behavior, when a high type man sees an equilibrium contract and contract C which offers him nothing, he will always go for an equilibrium contract first. Contract C never achieves the matching outcome "attracts W H " .
When a low type man sees contract B and contract C, he compares Table 4 summarizes the matching outcomes of offering contract C against equilibrium contracts. Table 5 then summarizes the different matching outcomes when W L offers contract B and contract C, given the other woman is offering her equilibrium contract. Table 5 suggests that contract C is a profitable deviation when
Profitable deviation Yes Yes
By offering contract C, the low type woman's chances of matching with M H is either improved in case 1 or remain unchanged in case 2 , so her expected payoff becomes higher as contract C allows women to extract all the surplus 10 . Therefore for a separating equilibrium to exist, we need p 0 α 1 + (1 − p 0 )α 0 = 0. This means a low type man gets 0 expected payoff from contract B.
From inequality (3), we must have
Step 2: Discuss two cases: either α 1 = α 0 = 0 or α 0 = 0, α 1 > 0.
In expectation she gets 
For p 1 β 1 + (1 − p 1 )β 0 = 0 we need β 0 = 0. In order to find values of β 1 and α 1 , I discuss two cases:
The requirement for efficiency when the marital surplus is stochastic is that we need
Only if the combination of an agent ranked high in the side offering contracts and an agent ranked low in the side choosing contracts, leads to a production of the lowest possible marital surplus with certainty, an efficient matching outcome may exist. The reasoning is explained below:
In a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency, when there exists competition for a high type man, a low type woman always loses the competition to a high type woman. She matches with M H with a positive probability only when there are two M H or the other woman is also of low type. Therefore the best for her is to offer 0 to 
The best separating equilibrium for W H is to offer β 1 = 
(z 2 − z 1 ). The upper bound is to prevent a high type woman from giving up attracting high type men: As the cost of attracting M H becomes too high, high type women may find offering nothing to men becomes a profitable deviation despite a worse matching outcome.
In contrast to the benchmark model:
1. In the benchmark model, a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency always exists. However, in the model with stochastic marital surplus, a separating equilibrium exists only if p 1 = 0. When random shocks are introduced into the marital surplus with non-trivial probabilities (neither 0 nor 1), there is no separating equilibrium in the contracts-offering game 11 . As pointed out in Remark 4, since Y G and Y B could be realized by any combination of types, any sharing rule conditional on any surplus state affects all types of agents. A high type woman needs to deter a low type man by offering him 0, which means she has to offer men 0 conditional on both Y G and Y B . However, such contract does not enable the high type woman to signal her type since a low type woman also offers 0 to men in the equilibrium. The conflict between deterring a low type partner (offering him zero amount) and signalling her high type (offering a contract different from a low type woman) renders contracts ineffective in achieving an efficient matching.
2. In the benchmark model, the amount offered to a high type man by a high type woman needs to be at least
. This is to prevent a low type woman from attempting to offer slightly more to win the high type man over. It is not related to preventing a mimic as women have costlessly signaled their types.
In the model with stochastic marital surplus, preventing a mimic may become costly for high type women (depends on whether p 2 > p 1 ). Consider a low type woman deviates to mimic M H by offering contract A. She will be regarded as a high type woman: When there is only one high type man, not only she wins the competition against another W L , but also she has half chance of matching with M H when competing against W H .
In fact, offering contract A always enables women to match with M H with a higher probability than offering contract B. In the benchmark model, this better matching does not lead to a higher expected payoff for a deviating W L since W H can costlessly punish a mimic by offering full amount to men conditional on z 1 and z 0 . However, in the model 11 In this case I have specified women to be be the side offering contracts, there could exist a separating equilibrium if we let men offer contracts instead in this case, see Figure 2 . However in the men offering contracts game, we then require p 1 = 0 when z 1 > z 0 . The main message is that even if we can let either side offer contracts, in the case z 2 > z 1 > z 0 and z 2 > z 1 > z 0 , there is still no separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency, see Claim 1.
with stochastic marital surplus, the only way she can punish a mimic is to offer a large amount to men conditional on Y G , since she has to offer 0 to men conditional on Y B . Suppose we have the freedom to choose which side to offer contracts, then combining Figure 1 and Figure 2 , Figure 3 represents the largest range of z where a separating equilibrium with matching efficiency can be found. As Figure 3 suggests, when the probability of realizing the good surplus state is non-trivial (neither 0 nor 1), and when z 2 > z 1 > z 0 and z 2 > z 1 > z 0 , that is, the expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, there is no separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency in the contracts-offering game.
To summarize main findings of the model:
Claim 1 When there is two-sided information asymmetry and the marital surplus is stochastic, and PAM is the efficient matching, let one side of the market, say women, offers contracts that propose some sharing rule of the realized surplus to men:
1. When there exits competition between women of different types, a necessary and sufficient condition to find a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency Game with one side offering contracts Game with one side offering contracts is that the combination of a man of the non-desired type and a woman of a different type, leads to a production of the lowest possible surplus with certainty.
2.
When expected surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, or agents of different types have the same rank of potential partners in terms of generating the total expected match surplus, there is no separating equilibrium that achieves an efficient matching outcome.
Social Planner's Mechanism
As pointed by Claim 1.2, when the probabilities of realizing the good surplus state are non-trivial (neither 0 nor 1), and when the side offering contracts have the same preference about partners' types in terms of total expected match surplus produced, the contracts-offering game in Section 2 cannot achieve matching efficiency. Section 3 asks is there any other mechanism able to achieve matching efficiency?
The set-up of a social planner's problem is the following:
Each agent, having observed only his or her own type, could either simultaneously and costlessly report his or her type to a social planner or choose not to report. A social planner commits to a mechanism specifying who matches with whom and how each surplus is shared as a function of the reported types. The social planner designs contracts C1-4, choosing β, µ, τ, and α to help achieve matching efficiency:
For N =2, if there is exactly one reported "high" type agent on each side of the matching market, the social planner matches "W H " with "M H " with the sharing rule specified in contract C 1 and matches "W L " with "M L " with the sharing rule specified in contract C 4 .
Matching efficiency is achieved. In other cases the social planner randomly matches the agents, as any re-arranging of the matching does not affect matching efficiency.
For general N , to achieve matching efficiency, the social planner makes sure the reported "high" type agents on the side which has fewer "high" type agents will all be matched with "high" type agents on the other side of the matching market.
Each agent, having observed his or her own type and knowing the contracts and matching rules, chooses whether to report his or her type truthfully.
By the Revelation Principle, Section 3 restricts attention to a direct revelation mechanism where each agent chooses to report truthfully to the social planner.
The two men-two women case
Proposition 4 In a symmetric setting (z 1 = z 1 ), if matching efficiency can be achieved, it can be achieved by a symmetric mechanism in which
and
Intuitively, when the genders are symmetric in terms of generating the surplus 14 , a symmetric mechanism which treats genders equally supports a separating equilibrium to the largest extent. If a symmetric mechanism cannot achieve matching efficiency in this setting, no asymmetric mechanism can. Therefore I focus the analysis on a symmetric mechanism: When the agents of the same types are matched, they always share the surplus equally. When agents of different types are matched, the high type agent gets the same amount regardless of one's gender. Hence, when z 1 = z 1 , the problem simplifies to can we find some
for a truthful direct revelation mechanism (TDRM) to achieve an efficient matching outcome?
Proposition 5 In a symmetric setting (z 1 = z 1 ) with N=2, there exists a truthful direct revelation mechanism where a social planner designs contracts to achieve matching efficiency if and only if
Proof. See appendix.
The condition
is to ensure that the smallest µ * 0 , which satisfies both high type and low type agents' incentive compatibility constraints, is no greater than Y B .
Remark 5 With N = 2, a social planner can do strictly better in terms of achieving matching efficiency than the equilibrium of the game in which one side offers contracts.
Whenever the contracts-offering game achieves matching efficiency with W H offering contract A and W L offering contract B, by replicating the contracts, matching efficiency can always be achieved in the social planner's setting. In addition, the social planner restricts the possible deviations of sharing the surplus to a much smaller set. In the contracts-offering game, for a separating equilibrium to exist, not only we need to show a woman will not deviate to mimic the other type, but also need to show that she will not deviate to offer any other contracts. In the social planner's setting, signaling becomes a binary choice as an agent can only report either high or low. This is equivalent to restrict a woman to offer either contract A or contract B in the contracts-offering game.
When expected surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, the social planner achieves an efficient matching under the condition
, even the one side offering contracts game does not.
Combining the two cases, we conclude that when N=2, a social planner does strictly better in terms of achieving matching efficiency than the contracts-offering game. Proposition 6 Let P N denotes the probability of matching with a high type man, M H , when a woman reports "high" type to the social planner.
It has the following properties:
2. P N increases with N and
when N is large. 
Proof. Table 6 explains calculation of P N , the probability of matching with M H when a woman reports "high" type to the social planner. Whether she can be matched with M H depends on i) how many high type men are there, and ii) how many women are also reporting "high" type. For instance, when all the other women are reporting "low" type, the woman becomes the only one reporting "high" type, she will be matched with a high type man with probability 1 when the number of M H equal to or greater than one (see line 1). If all the other N − 1 women are also reporting "high" type, and there is only one M H , then her probability of matching with M H becomes 1 N (see the last line, column 2).
To calculate P N , I sum up all conditional probabilities in Table 6 . See appendix.
The properties of P N are quite intuitive. 1. With random matching, a woman will be matched with M H with probability half. In a mechanism that aims to achieve matching efficiency, a woman reporting "high" type will be matched with M H with a probability greater than half as the social planner attempts to match W H with M H whenever it is possible. 2. As the number of agents increases on both sides of the market, a woman is more likely to face the scenario that there are
high type women out there and N 2 high type men. The probability of the woman reporting "high" type and then matching with
1 N which increases with N . 3. As N becomes very large, the probability approaches 1.
Corollary 2 The probability of matching with a low type man, M L , when a woman reports "low" type to the social planner, is also P N .
Theorem 3
In the symmetric setting with N men and N women, there exists a truthful direct revelation mechanism which achieves an efficient matching if and only if
where
is to ensure that the smallest µ * 0 , which satisfies both high type and low type agents' incentive compatibility constraints, is no greater than Y B . As the number of agents increases,
increases, the inequality is harder to sustain. Similarly for
. The two conditions to ensure matching efficiency become more stringent as N increases.
Condition (4) represents low type agents' incentive compatibility constraint:
Largest expected loss by misreporting as "H"
Expected gain by misreporting as "H"
The right-hand side of inequality (4) represents the expected gain from mis-reporting as a "high" type agent. For a low type women (same analysis for a low type men), if she truthfully reports as W L , she will be matched with M L with probability P N and sharing the surplus z 0 equally. If she mis-reports as W H , she will be matched with M H with probability P N and share the surplus z 1 equally. Therefore her expected gain from mis-reporting is P N (
). The left-hand side represents the largest expected loss from mis-reporting as a "high" type agent. In a symmetric mechanism, the most severe punishment to a deviating low type agent is to set µ 1 = Y G and µ 0 = Y B . 15 After reporting truthfully as "low" type, she matches with M H with probability 1 − P N and gets z 1 ; after mis-reporting as "high" type, she matches with M L with probability 1 − P N and gets 0.
The largest expected loss from mis-reporting is therefore (1 − P N )z 1 . Condition (4) is necessary to prevent low type agents from mis-reporting.
Note that when N is large, P N approaches 1, condition (4) becomes 0 ≥ z 1 −z 0 2 which does not hold when z 1 > z 0 . Matching efficiency therefore cannot be achieved in the social planner's setting. Because in a symmetric mechanism, agents of the same reported types share the surplus equally, when a woman reports as "low" type, she will match with a low type man with probability almost equal to 1 and gets an expected surplus of z 0 2
. When she reports as "high" type, she will match with a high type man with probability almost equal to 1 and gets an expected surplus of
. It is always profitable for a low type agent to mis-report when N is large.
To summarize main findings of the social planner's problem:
Claim 2 When there is two-sided information asymmetry and the marital surplus is stochastic, consider a truthful direct revelation mechanism where a social planner designs contracts proposing some sharing rules of the realized surplus:
1. With finite number of agents, the social planner can do strictly better than the contracts-offering game.
2. His ability to achieve matching efficiency decreases with the number of agents in the matching market.
3. When N is very large, an efficient matching cannot be achieved. When there is competition for M H , in the equilibrium W L extracts all the surplus, and
Nevertheless, a high type man's expected payoff is always strictly less than that of a high type woman. 16 Similar results hold when there is competition for M L . Hence, a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency in the women offering contracts game is strictly preferred to the men offering contracts game by all women. There is 15 It specifies that when a high type agent matches with a low type agent, the high type agent gets 0 surplus and the low type agent gets the full surplus, this provides the low type agents the largest incentive to report truthfully.
first mover advantage in the contracts-offering game. This is analogous to the first mover advantage in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, that in a non-transferrable utility model, for all women, a stable matching outcome obtained when women propose to men (weakly)
Pareto dominates the stable matching when men propose to women.
2. In the contracts-offering game, the harder to verify agents' types from the surplus value, the more difficult to achieve matching efficiency. Section 2
shows that in the benchmark model where each realized surplus state fully reveals the combination of agents' types, a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency can always be found. However, in the model with stochastic marital surplus, the realized surplus states do not reveal any information about agents' types. When the expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents' types, no separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency exists. The set-up below provides an intermediate case with
partial verifiability of agents' types. Comparing the different results suggests that the harder to verify agent's types, the more difficult to achieve matching efficiency.
The partial non-verifiability comes from z 1 : z 1 reveals that is must be produced by a combination of a high type agent and a low type agent, but it does not tell exactly who is of low type. As a result any sharing rule conditional on z 1 affects agents of all types. It can be shown that in the intermediate case, the range of z supporting matching efficiency is larger than that in the model with stochastic marital surplus, and smaller than the range of z in the benchmark model. Section 3 shows that an agent's incentive compatibility constraint is not always satisfied in a truthful DRM, hence matching efficiency is not always achievable. An alternative approach to deal with agents' incentives is to propose a "global" sharing rule. For example, the social planner can specify that any agent will get 1 4 of the aggregate matching surplus in the two men-two women case. Such a global sharing rule aligns agents' incentives with the social planner's. However, such analysis has to assume that the social planner can 17 The analysis is essentially the same as in Section 2. In the equilibrium W L offers 0 to men. In order to deter W L , W H offers 0 conditional on z 1 . However, this will induce W L to mimic as now she is able to get the full surplus when she matches with M H . To punish a mimic, W H offers the full amount to men conditional on z 0 . Therefore, to sustain a separating equilibrium with matching efficiency, the benefit of mimicking, z 1 , cannot be too large relative to z 0 , the cost of mimicking. With N = 2, we need z 1 ≤ Then when agents' types are only privately known, an agent's outside option also becomes private information. Although the absolute amount of a couple's marital output can be verified, the marital surplus-total output subtracting the sum of the two agents' outside options-is no longer verifiable. As a result, sharing rules have to condition on the total marital output instead. The bounds on what can be shared enlarges. As now in some states an agent may get less than what he or she produces when being single, the new analysis needs to take into account each agent's participation constraint: Ex-ante an agent expects non-negative gains from marriage.
The qualitative conclusions remain. In the contracts-offering game, whether matching efficiency can be achieved depends on to what extent the marital output is informative about agents' types. In the social planner's mechanism, there exists a larger range of z supporting matching efficiency in the truthful DRM. 18 However when N becomes large, matching efficiency is still not achievable.
Conclusion
This paper examines a marriage market with two-sided information asymmetry and in which the match surplus is stochastic. My main focus is on how endogenous determination 18 Previously, the smallest µ * 0 , the amount a low type agent gets when being matched with a high type agent conditional on Y B , which satisfies all agents' incentive compatibility constraints, needs to be no greater than Y B . Now this condition can be relaxed to some extent, that µ * 0 can be greater than Y B to compensate a low type agent more.
of the sharing rule can help to achieve an efficient matching. I find that when marital surplus is deterministic, matching efficiency can be achieved by a simple contracts-offering game, where contracts proposing some sharing of the surplus serve as a credible signal to reveal one's type, and as a screening device to attract a suitable partner. However, when random shocks are introduced into marital surplus, matching efficiency is not always achievable, especially when the number of agents is large. A natural next step would be to examine some costly pre-marital signals which affects agents of different types differently and helps to achieve an efficient matching. Matching efficiency with costly pre-marital signals when marital surplus is stochastic, can then be related to the literate on efficiency of pre-marital investment. and contract E 2 , as they achieve no better matching. W L will prefer contract B to contract E 3
For W H , the best contract E 2 (contract in the form of E 2 that achieves the highest possible payoff for W H ) is strictly dominated by the best contract F , as both contracts achieve the same matching, but W H could offer 0 to men conditional z 2 and z 1 in contract F . The best contract C and contract E 1 are strictly dominated by the best contract F as they achieve no better matching outcome. W H will not deviate to offer contract F iff
(z 2 − z 1 ); and will not deviate to offer contract E 3 iff
will support a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency.
Proof of Theorem 2:
] satisfy the six conditions below, therefore a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency always exists when z 1 > z 0 and p 1 = 0.
Surplus Woman
Man
where γ
women's expected payoff subject to the constraint that it "attract both" when competing against contract A and contract B. 
H . Hence it is not possible for a high type woman to achieve "attract only W H " by deviating when competing against contract A. b). When there are two W L , one M H and one M L : Similarly there exists competition between the two low type women to attempt to win the only low type man over. However for whatever W L offers in the off-equilibrium contract H such that P M L H ≥ p 0 ε , we also have P M H H ≥ p 0 ε > p 1 ε since z 0 > z 1 implies p 0 > p 1 . Therefore both M H and M L will be attracted over. It is not possible for W L to achieve "attract only W L " by deviating when competing against contract B.
Lemma 1 When z 1 < z 0 and z 2 ≤ z 1 , a necessary condition to find a separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency is p 1 = 0.
Proof. z 1 < z 0 implies W L prefers M L in terms of total surplus produced. z 2 ≤ z 1 implies W H also prefers M L in terms of total surplus produced. There exists competition between W H and W L for a low type man. The same reasoning as Theorem 1, we need p 1 = 0. W H will offer 0 to men in a separating equilibrium. In order to attract only M L , W L needs to offer 0 expected surplus to M H . However, in order to signal her type, she needs to offer a contract different Off-equilibrium beliefs: µ(W H |any other off-equilibrium contracts) = 0
Off-equilibrium response rule: A man will go for the contract which gives him the maximum payoff first, if he did not get it, he will then go for the next contract which gives him the second largest payoff, and so on, until he is matched with a contract. When being indifferent between an equilibrium contract and an off-equilibrium contract: M L will go for an off-equilibrium contract first; M H will go for an equilibrium contract first. The condition z 1 ≤ P N 2P N −1 z 0 is to ensure that W L will not mimic M H by offering contract A. When N=2, we require z 1 ≤ 2.5z 0 . When N is very large, the condition becomes z 1 ≤ z 0 .
